We describe Þrm pricing when consumers search passively and follow simple reservation price rules. In stark contrast to other models in the literature, this approach yields equilibrium price dispersion in pure strategies even when Þrms have the same marginal costs. In equilibrium, lower price Þrms earn higher proÞts. The range of price dispersion increases with the number of Þrms: the highest price is the monopoly one, while the lowest price tends to marginal cost. The average transaction price remains substantially above marginal cost even with many Þrms. Introducing shoppers who buy from the cheapest Þrm may increase market prices.
Introduction
Price dispersion is well documented and yet economists do not have a broadly accepted theory explaining it. It persists in numerous econometric studies even after accounting for differences in product quality and location of service (see Pratt, Wise, and Zeckhauser, 1979 for a classic paper and Lach, 2002, Barron, Taylor, and Umbeck, 2003, and Hosken and Reiffen, 2004 , for recent exemplary studies). Price dispersion can naturally derive from differences in costs or product qualities (see Anderson and de Palma, 2001, for example) or from market frictions such as imperfect consumer information. The latter motivates consumer search, and one might a priori expect search costs to be at the heart of much dispersion of prices. However, there are few theoretical models that deliver equilibrium price dispersion from a consumer search framework. Indeed, the major result in the area is due to Diamond (1971) and has three disturbing features: there is no dispersion, the equilibrium price is the monopoly one, and there is no consumer search in equilibrium.
The simple version of the Diamond paradox is as follows. Suppose that consumers face a cost c per search, and each consumer is in the market for one unit of the product sold.
Suppose also that different consumers have different valuations for the good. Then, assuming the Þrst search is costless, the outcome is that all Þrms set the monopoly price against the market demand deÞned from the distribution of consumer valuations. 4 Consumers rationally expect this price, so their search rule is to stop as soon as they Þnd it. Given this behavior, 4 Stiglitz (1979) pointed out that the market unravels if the Þrst search is costly. Then any consumer with a valuation close to or below the monopoly price would choose not to enter the market since she would expect the monopoly price and therefore not to be able to recoup the sunk Þrst search cost. Without such customers, the optimal price would be higher, meaning further consumers would not wish to enter, etc. As Diamond Þrms can do no better than set the monopoly price: any lower price would not be expected and so would attract no more searchers.
Paradoxically, all Þrms set the monopoly price regardless of how many of them there are and no matter how small the search cost (as long as it is positive). No consumer searches since they Þnd the anticipated monopoly price on the Þrst Þrm sampled. Subsequent authors (e.g. Rob, 1985 , and Stahl, 1989 have introduced a mass of consumers with zero search costs (sometimes called "shoppers") and have shown that then there exists a mixed strategy equilibrium. 5 This approach therefore yields equilibrium price dispersion insofar as the realizations of the mixed strategies lead to disparate prices. Many commentators though remain uneasy with the use of mixed strategies in price games, and the price dispersion equilibrium depends crucially on there being agents with zero search costs.
An alternative direction was followed by Reinganum (1979) , who introduced different production costs across Þrms. 6 The solution is simply enough illustrated with two Þrms (Reinganum assumes a continuum). Effectively, dispersion is achieved through there being different "monopoly" prices. Indeed, the outcome is that each Þrm charges its monopoly 5 Salop and Stiglitz (1977) present a model of "bargains and rip-offs" (or "tourists and natives") in which there are many Þrms, each with a standard U-shaped average cost function. In equilibrium, provided there are enough natives (who have zero search costs and so know which Þrms are pricing at minimum average cost), then there is a two-price equilibrium at which some Þrms specialize in setting high prices to rip-off the unlucky tourists who do not hazard upon a low-price Þrm. As the authors show, there is either a two-price equilibrium or a single-price one, so the model does not admit a very rich pattern of price dispersion. 6 See also Pereira (2003) for a modern treatment. In a similar vein, assume different production costs, and generate price dispersion along with several interesting properties of the equilibrium price distribution. However, they assume that a deviation by a Þrm is observed by consumers, in the sense that consumers know the actual price distribution (as opposed to rationally inferring the distribution, as is so in the rest of the Diamond Paradox literature).
price if the search cost exceeds the consumer surplus differential between the two monopoly prices. Otherwise, the high price can only exceed the low monopoly price by an amount that renders the differential consumer surplus equal to the search cost. As compared to the previous paradox results, Reinganum's model does deliver price dispersion, but the other two parts to the paradox -monopoly pricing and no search in equilibrium -remain. However, the dispersion result generated from this assumption also bears comment. Note Þrst that the two monopoly prices are closer together than the costs if the consumer demand function is not "too convex". 7 Since the equilibrium price differences cannot exceed the monopoly price differences, the model predicts compression of cost differences. The logic holds furthermore when there are more Þrms, so that the extent of price dispersion is less than the degree of cost dispersion. Put another way, substantial (and rather incredible) cost dispersion would be needed to generate the extensive price dispersion observed in the data. Furthermore, generating price dispersion from cost dispersion seems rather besides the point. To make the point that search costs can be responsible for price dispersion, one should start from cost symmetry. This we do here.
Price dispersion intrigued Stigler, who recognized it in many markets from anthracite coal to bananas (Stigler, 1961) . His interest in the subject led him Þrst to formulate the solution to the search problem of a consumer who faces Þrms setting disparate prices. The distribution of prices is assumed to be known, but acquiring information about any price is costly. Optimal search behavior is described by a stopping (or reservation price) rule: the consumer keeps searching (at a constant cost per search) until she Þnds a price below her reservation price; then she buys. The lower a consumer's search cost the lower her reservation price. Our Þrst contribution in this paper is to give the solution to the mirror problem from 7 If demand is linear, the monopoly price differential is half the cost differential. The price differential is always less than the cost differential if demand is log-concave, a standard assumption.
that solved by Stigler. That is, we solve the problem faced by Þrms (on the other side of the market) when consumers buy according to stopping price rules.
We take from Stigler the idea of consumer reservation price rules. However, in the typical rational expectations model, agents are assumed to be able to perfectly predict equilibrium prices, meaning that they can not only solve the model from the perspective of all active agents, but they also know all of the relevant parameters, such as the number of Þrms and their cost levels, and the distribution of consumer reservation values. It requires considerable computational ability to solve for the equilibrium; it also seems incredulous that consumers know all the parameters that enter the model. To justify such an assumption, one might argue that consumers learn over time and adapt to optimal behavior through repeated exposure.
But there are many products that consumers encounter rarely, and for which they can hardly have much experience. They are then likely to use simple algorithms (or rules of thumb), which, in the search context, translate into simple reservation price rules. This seems especially true for things not often bought, and the modern marketplace changes so quickly that the market parameters may be very different between two purchases of a lap-top computer (say). The sheer enormity of the number of decisions the shopper must make in the supermarket is another factor in the consumer's use of a simple rule.
Thus we propose here a theory of price dispersion that is complementary to the existing body of theory. The discussion above suggests it should apply better in situations where consumers search passively and when they have little or no prior experience of the product category in question. In contrast to the usual approaches, our approach admits a pure strategy equilibrium, which exhibits several interesting patterns. Prices are dispersed even with symmetric production costs, the price spread rises with the number of Þrms in the market, and the average price falls with the number of Þrms but remains bounded away from marginal cost. Prices are bounded above by the monopoly level, and consumers do not necessarily buy at the Þrst Þrm encountered.
We Þrst derive a demand system for passive search goods. The demand system, its properties and the monopoly solution are presented in Section 2. The oligopoly case is described in Section 3, while its implications are described in Section 4. We show that the equilibria are necessarily dispersed and we characterize the price schedule and the proÞt ranking. Even in the limit where the number of Þrms gets large, perfect competition is not attained. In Section 5, we consider the linear demand function case and discuss the explicit solutions. Section 6 treats two extensions. First, analysis of the multi-outlet monopolist helps explain why oligopoly proÞts can rise with the number of Þrms. Second, when lowprice seekers ("shoppers") coexist with other buyers, we show the former impose a negative externality on the others. Concluding remarks are presented in Section 7.
Demand
There are n Þrms and production costs are zero. Each Þrm sets the price for the good it sells to maximize expected proÞt. There is a population of consumers with mass normalized to unity. Consumers encounter the goods sequentially and in random order. A consumer buys one unit as soon as she is faced with price below her reservation price, and then exits 
The demand system
We now derive the demand system when consumers have disparate reservation prices. Note that the random matching protocol implies that each consumer buys with equal probability any good whose price is below her personal reservation price.
We label the goods such that 0 ≤ p 1 ≤ p 2 ≤ ... ≤ p n ≤ 1. Only consumers with reservation prices exceeding p n will ever buy good n, and will only do so when it is the Þrst good encountered. Since the probability of having a reservation price below p n is F (p n ), the mass of consumers who might potentially buy good n is 1− F (p n ). Because this good carries the highest price, these consumers are split equally among all goods. Hence, the demand for the most expensive good, n, is:
We can deÞne demand recursively. The demand of the second lowest price good is composed of two pieces. First, those consumers with a reservation price above p n have a probability of 1 /n of purchasing this good. Second, the consumers who have a reservation price between p n−1 and p n are equally likely to purchase any of the n − 1 goods below their reservation price. We can determine the demand for the good with the i th highest price in an analogous manner. This demand comprises the demand addressed to the good with the next highest price (this follows from the way consumers are shared equally among goods whose prices are below reservation levels) plus good i's share of the consumers whose reservation prices lie between p i and p i+1 , which share is 1 /i. Using this recursion, we can write the demand system as :
In this demand system, a good with a higher price attracts fewer consumers, as expected (so D i = D j whenever p j = p i , and D i < D j whenever p j < p i ). Firms with prices above the lowest one in the market are not obliterated as long as they price below 1. The overall structure can be seen quite clearly by writing out in full the demand for the lowest-priced good, which gives
The demand system is illustrated in Figure 1 . Figure 1a illustrates which goods are purchased by which consumers (as a function of their reservation prices) and the numbers in an area indicate the goods bought (with equal probability). Figure 1b shows the same information with reference to the monopoly demand curve. The fractions along the quantity axis denote the number of Þrms sharing a consumer segment. The demand system above has some interesting properties. Although the demand for the good with the lowest price depends on all other prices, the demand for the good with the next lowest price is independent of the level of the lowest price. Similarly, demand for the good with the i th lowest price is independent of the prices of all goods with lower prices than it since good i gets no demand from consumers whose reservation prices are less than p i . Indeed, the prices of goods 1 through i − 1 only determine how the demand from the F (p i ) consumers whose reservation prices are less than p i is split up.
In summary, the demand for good i is independent of all lower prices and is a continuous function of all higher prices. This is very different from the standard (homogenous goods) framework in which the good with the lowest price is the only one consumers buy. In our framework, when a Þrm reduces its price (locally) it picks up demand continuously from consumers who previously viewed it as too expensive.
Monopoly preliminaries
Although we are primarily interested in price dispersion in a competitive setting, the properties of the monopoly solution are key to describing the situation with several Þrms. For this reason, we take some time in elaborating the monopoly solution.
We shall use the following technical assumptions, later referred to as A1:
is twice continuously differentiable with F (0) = 0, F (1) = 1, and
is strictly convex for v ∈ (0, 1).
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Assumption 1A introduces sufficient continuity for simplicity and also embodies the normalization of the demand curve to have unit price and quantity intercepts. Assumption 1B
It is implied by log-concavity of 1−F (v), which is in turn implied by log-concavity of f (v) (see Caplin and Nalebuff, 1991) . A stronger property is the log-concavity of f (v) which is veriÞed by most of the densities commonly used in economics, such as the uniform, the truncated normal, beta, exponential, and any concave function. However, any density that is not quasiconcave violates Assumption 1B.
implies that the monopoly problem is well behaved in a sense made precise below. 9 We shall use the subscript m to denote monopoly values. The proÞt function facing the single Þrm selling a single product is
Since π m (0) = π m (1) = 0, the monopoly price p m is interior and
given by the implicit solution to the Þrst-order condition:
The right-hand side of this expression is positive, decreasing and continuous in p by A1.
Therefore, there exists a unique solution p m ∈ (0, 1) to (3), which maximizes proÞt. We prove the remainder of the following result in the Appendix: 
At an intuitive level, Assumption 1B implies that demand is not "too" convex. This ensures that the corresponding marginal revenue curve (with respect to price) is decreasing whenever marginal revenue is non-negative. Equivalently, this lemma establishes that the monopoly proÞt function is strictly concave up through its maximum and thereafter it is decreasing.
Competitive price dispersion
The reservation price model can be interpreted as one in which consumers are impatient and buy as soon as they encounter a price below their valuation of the good. Nevertheless, the equilibrium is very different from that of a search model with high cost per search. In the latter, clearly all Þrms set the monopoly price (if the Þrst search is costless: otherwise no consumer will ever enter and the market will not exist). Here, where search is passive rather than active, prices are necessarily dispersed in equilibrium. Although one Þrm charges the monopoly price, all other Þrms charge lower prices. To see this suppose that instead all Þrms charged the monopoly price. Then if one Þrm cuts its price slightly, its demand rises by the number of consumers whose reservation prices lie between the monopoly price and its new price. However, if all Þrms had reduced their prices in concert, then each Þrm would have received only 1 /n th of such consumers, and this is the calculus of the monopoly problem. 10 The proÞt of Firm i is π i = p i D i , where D i is given by equation (2) . The following lemma, proved in the Appendix, enables us to proceed henceforth solely from interior solutions to the Þrst-order conditions.
Lemma 2 (No bunching) Each
Þrm chooses a distinct price at any pure strategy equilibrium, i.e., p 1 < p 2 < ... < p n .
The intuition is as follows. If two Þrms were bunched at the same price, then demand facing either of them is kinked at that price and demand is more elastic for lower prices since the Þrms split the marginal consumer with fewer rivals. Hence marginal revenue is greater to 10 Since the monopoly price is such that the loss in revenue from price reduction is just compensated by the increased revenue from extra customers (for a very small price change), then a single Þrm must gain when it cuts its price from the monopoly level since the lost revenue on existing customers is much smaller because it has 1 /n th of the customer base of the group.
the right than to the left so that the marginal revenue curve jumps up at the corresponding output. Therefore there cannot be a proÞt maximum at such a point.
This means that any pure strategy price equilibrium involves price dispersion (i.e. interior solutions to Þrst-order conditions) for all Þrms. The highest priced Þrm, n, charges the monopoly price p m (see (3)). This price is independent of the number of Þrms, because Firm n's demand is independent of all other (lower) prices. 11 We can then solve for the candidate equilibrium prices from the top down. The Þrst-order condition is:
, we have the following simple relation between prices and demands at the candidate equilibrium:
The corresponding second-order conditions for local maxima are:
where the inequality follows from Lemma 1 since p i < p m . Thus, the assumption A1 on F (.)
ensure that the Þrst-order conditions do characterize local maxima.
The price expressions (4) can be used to construct a recursive relation for the equilibrium prices. Rewriting equation (2) gives:
Since D i+1 = p i+1 f (p i+1 ) /(i + 1) by (4) applied to Firm i + 1, we can substitute for the demands in (5) to give: 11 Although the corresponding proÞt level is 1 /n of the monopoly proÞt.
with p n given by (3) . This recurrent system is easy to solve explicitly when F is a power function. We consider the example of the uniform density below.
The next proposition crystallizes the no-bunching property of equilibrium:
Proposition 1 (Price dispersion) Under A1, there is a unique candidate pure strategy price equilibrium. It solves (3) and (6) and entails p 1 < p 2 < ... < p n = p m . Furthermore, the solution is a local equilibrium. (6) is increasing in p. Therefore, if p i > p i+1 we have a contradiction. Thus the Þrst-order conditions yield prices that are consistent with the ranking p 1 < p 2 < ... < p n . It remains to
show that there is a unique solution to (3) and (6) . This is true since p n = p m is uniquely determined and since p i is uniquely determined from (6) given p i+1 under the condition that
The structure of the equilibrium prices is characterized in the next section, and illustrated in the one after for a uniform density.
4 Dispersion properties
Price dispersion
First, as expected, more Þrms provoke more competition in the following sense:
Proposition 2 (Falling prices) The i th lowest price in equilibrium (1 ≤ i < n) is strictly decreasing in the number of Þrms, n. The price range p n − p 1 rises with n.
Proof. Recall Þrst equation (6):
Lemma 1 established that F (p) + pf(p) is increasing in p for p ≤ p m and Proposition 2
showed that p i < p m for all i < n. Hence, the left-hand side of (6) is increasing in p i while the right-hand side is increasing in p i+1 . Any decrease in p i+1 therefore elicits a decrease in p i . Adding a new Þrm at the top price p m causes the next highest price to fall, so prices fall all down the line. This means that the lowest price falls with n. Together with the property that the highest price, p n , is independent of the number of Þrms, this implies that p n − p 1 is increasing in n.
Hence, price dispersion increases with the number of Þrms in the sense that the price range in equilibrium broadens. Next we show that the k th highest price rises with the number of Þrms.
Proposition 3 (Rising prices)
The k th highest price in equilibrium (1 < k ≤ n − 1) is strictly increasing in n.
Proof. The proof of Proposition 2 established that neighboring prices move in the same direction. Since the highest price is unaffected by entry, it suffices to show that the second highest price rises with a new Þrm. With n Þrms, the second highest price, p n−1 , is implicitly given from (6) by:
side increases with n, so that p n−1 must also increase with n (by Lemma 1 and Proposition 2, since then F (p) + pf (p) is increasing in p).
The above results show that prices are always dispersed and fan out as the number of
Þrms increases. The top price stays at the monopoly price and the bottom price decreases.
As we argue below, in the limiting case n → ∞, the lowest price goes to the competitive price of zero. The asymmetry of equilibrium prices is also reßected in asymmetric proÞts.
ProÞt dispersion
Price dispersion is associated in our model with proÞt dispersion. Contrast for example
Butters' (1977) model of advertising in which all Þrms earn zero proÞt by the equilibrium condition. In an oligopoly version of the Butters model, Robert and Stahl (1993) Þnd equilibrium price dispersion in that the equilibrium entails non-degenerate mixed strategies.
However, since the equilibrium mixture is the same for all Þrms, proÞts are still equalized.
Another model with price dispersion is the Bargains and Rip-offs (or Tourists and Natives)
set-up of Salop and Stiglitz (1977) . Since they also close the model with a zero proÞt condition for both the Bargain and the Rip-off Þrms, proÞt asymmetries cannot arise. We now consider how proÞts vary across Þrms.
Proposition 4 (ProÞt ranking) Lower price Þrms earn strictly higher proÞts:
The total proÞt earned in the market place, The reason that the market proÞt exceeds the single product monopoly proÞt is that there are multiple products offered at different prices. This is a rather unusual result with constant marginal cost. 12 It will not hold under Cournot competition with a homogeneous product because there the Law of One Price holds. 13 Interestingly, Stahl (1989) shows that more Þrms (recall he has a mass of consumers with zero search costs, and a Þnite number of Þrms, and so a mixed strategy equilibrium) lead to an increase in prices (which result he terms "more monopolistic") in the symmetric equilibrium density. However, Stahl does not calculate the effect on total proÞt of further entry. Our result holds because it allows some price discrimination across consumer types with different reservation prices. 14 We pick up on this theme below in the Section 6.1 on the behavior of a multi-outlet monopolist.
The proÞt ranking found in Proposition 4 is somewhat unusual in oligopoly theory. In our setting, low price/high volume Þrms earn the highest proÞts. In many other models, such as those of vertical differentiation, and in asymmetric discrete choice oligopoly models 15 12 With increasing marginal cost, clearly an oligopoly has an efficiency advantage in production, and so it is possible that total proÞts are higher (in, say, a Cournot oligopoly). A similar result can hold for a competitive industry. 13 The result can also hold under product differentiation due to a market expansion effect. To illustrate, suppose half the consumers care only about product 1, while the other half are only interested in product 2.
Then two Þrms in this "industry" earn twice as much as one alone. 14 This is reminiscent of Salop's (1977) noisy monopolist result, although Salop assumes that consumers observe the prices set before searching -otherwise the monopolist will not be noisy, and faces the Diamond (1971) paradox. 15 Although note that Þrms with high mark-ups produce larger volumes in Cournot competition with homogenous goods.
Market prices
With passive search, not all consumers buy at the lowest price in the market. Thus, even though we show below that the lowest price goes to zero (marginal cost), this does not necessarily mean that the market solution effectively attains the competitive limit. It might also be that equilibrium prices pile up close to marginal cost, so almost all consumers would buy at competitive prices. We now show that this is not the case, and instead the average transaction price paid by consumers is bounded away from marginal cost.
Proposition 5 (Margins)
The demand-weighted market price strictly exceeds marginal cost and is bounded below by p m D m .
Proof. Let p a = ( It does perhaps seem unusual to compare prices against the yardstick of proÞts. This, though, is just a normalization issue since the total potential demand (the quantity intercept on demand) has been set to unity. The generalization is the proÞt per potential consumer.
Market forces do not drive prices to marginal cost for passive search goods. It is not product differentiation that underlies this result, since we have shown it with a homogeneous good, and so it is distinct from Chamberlinian monopolistically competitive mark-ups. It is also distinctive from the symmetric Chamberlinian (1933) set-up because equilibria involve price dispersion, with distinct prices for all Þrms in a pure strategy equilibrium. Perhaps the closest result is that of Butters (1977) 
Limiting cases
There are two dimensions in which the market outcome resembles the standard competitive one as the number of Þrms gets large.
Proposition 6 (Low price)
The lowest price in the market tends to zero when n goes to inÞnity. ProÞts for each Þrm go to zero.
Proof. Recall Þrst that the Þrst-order condition from (4) for the lowest price Þrm is p 1 =
. Suppose that p 1 does not go to 0 and thus has a lower bound,
is quasi-concave. Then D 1 is also bounded below by p f . Since Firm 2's Þrst-order condition is p 2 f (p 2 ) /2 = D 2 , and since p 2 > p 1 > p, D 2 is bounded below by p f /2. Following the same reasoning, D i is bounded below by p f /i. Therefore, market demand is bounded below by p f P n i=1 1 /i, which diverges as n → ∞. Then total demand is unbounded, a contradiction. Consequently, Firm 1 charges a price which converges to 0 as n → ∞.
Since π 1 = p 1 D 1 , with D 1 < 1, Firm 1's proÞt clearly converges to 0 as n → ∞. Given that π 1 > π 2 > ...π n from Proposition 4, all proÞts go to zero with n.
Other properties are illustrated with the uniform density below, for which we show that the difference between consecutive prices falls as we climb the price ladder. The implication is that more Þrms price above the midpoint of the equilibrium price range than below, and the average is also higher than the midpoint.
Equilibrium existence
The model above is interesting for its asymmetric candidate equilibria. However, the model is also complicated to analyze because the proÞt function is only piecewise quasi-concave.
The proÞt function may switch from a negative to a positive slope at a price equal to a rival's price. This feature means that a candidate proÞt maximum must be carefully veriÞed by checking deviations into price ranges deÞned by intervals between rivals' prices. The problem stems from a demand function that kinks out as one Þrm's price passes through that of a rival (and hence a marginal revenue curve that jumps up at such a point: recall we used this argument in showing Lemma 2). The demand kink in turn arises because a Þrm competes with fewer Þrms at lower prices.
We can prove analytically two further properties that are useful in determining global equilibrium. First, the prices found constitute a local equilibrium whereby each Þrm's proÞt is maximized provided it prices between its two neighbors. Indeed, we showed above that the unique candidate solution to the Þrst order conditions satisÞes the ranking condition.
Furthermore, each Þrm's proÞt is maximized on the interval between its two neighbors' prices since proÞts on these intervals are concave functions. This type of local equilibrium is a useful result because it ensures the solution is robust at least to price changes by Þrms that do not change the order of prices.
To prove the existence of a (global) equilibrium we must look at what happens under all possible deviations. The class of such deviations we need to consider is reduced because we can show that no Þrm can earn more charging a higher price. Indeed, by the fact we have proved the solution is a local equilibrium, it suffices to show that no Þrm i wishes to set a price strictly above
it would become the "new" j th Þrm, in the sense of setting the j th lowest price. But then its proÞt could not exceed π j since the original p j was set to maximize π j for p5 (p j−1 , p j+1 ),
, and the proÞt of the Þrm in the j th position is independent of p 2 , ..., p j−1 , the prices of all lower-price Þrms. Hence (using
In the next section we consider a uniform distribution and we verify numerically that there are no proÞtable deviations from the candidate equilibrium. As will be seen, the local equilibrium is also global, but the proÞt functions are not quasi-concave, which would suggest that analytic proofs are unlikely to be forthcoming.
Uniform distribution of reservation prices
The structure of the model can be easily comprehended for the uniform distribution that gives rise to linear demand. We can also get more precise characterization results for this case.
Price dispersion
For a uniform valuation density, the highest price is given by (3) as p n = p m = 1 /2. The other prices are given by (6) as
This recurrent structure tells us several properties about the structure of equilibrium price dispersion. Relative prices, p i+1 /p i , fall with i. Moreover, as we show below using the closed form solution for prices, absolute prices differences also fall with i. This means that the density of equilibrium prices is thicker at the top and tails off for lower prices.
We can also study how price dispersion changes with n. First, it is readily veriÞed that the i th lowest price (1 ≤ i < n) is strictly decreasing in the number of Þrms (see Proposition 2). Second, the difference between any pair of prices decreases with the number of Þrms.
This follows from (7) For example, under duopoly, the high price Þrm sells to 1 /4 of the consumer population at a price of 1 /2, while the low price Þrm sells to 3 /8 of the population at a price of 3 /8.
Total proÞts under duopoly are thus 17 /64, this exceeds the monopoly proÞt of 1 /4, which is consistent with Proposition 4. However, total proÞts do not monotonically increase with the number of Þrms: we show below that they fall to the monopoly level as the number of
Þrms gets large.
The explicit expression for the equilibrium prices is given by recursion by (using the
This series veriÞes the property p * 1 < p * 2 < ... < p * n . Writing out the double factorial expressions yields:
This equation can be used to verify the property noted above that absolute price differences contract toward the highest price. 16 The limit case for prices and proÞts as the number of Þrms gets arbitrarily large is determined in the next section. 16 From (7), we get
, with K > 0 a constant which only depends on n.
Limit results for the uniform density case
We can use Stirling's approximation 17 (which is i! ≈ √ 2π √ ii i e −i , for integer i) on expression (8) as both i and n go to inÞnity (with i /n Þnite) to write:
Fix x = i /n ∈ (0, 1) to write the limiting price as
Clearly this price is independent of n and it yields the monopoly price of 1 /2 at the upper end. This expression can be readily inverted to yield the cumulative distribution of prices as G(p) = (2p) 2 , which means a linear density of g(p) = 8p, for p ∈ (0, 1 /2). The average limiting price across Þrms is 1 /3, while the median price is 1
The demand weighted price is the average price actually paid by consumers in the market place. Half the consumers have reservation prices above the monopoly level and so will buy the Þrst good encountered. Given the distribution above, the price they pay is the average price across Þrms, which is 1 /3. A consumer with a lower reservation price v will buy as soon as she encounters a price below that reservation level. The expected price paid is then 2v /3. Since the density of reservation prices is uniform, we can apply the average value of v (which is 1 /4 for these consumers) and so the average price they pay is 1 /6. Combining these two averages, the average price paid in the market is p a = 1 /4. 18 Therefore, the average price decreases from 1 /2 in the monopoly case to 1 /4 in the limiting case n → ∞.
The value of p a = 1 /4 is also the value of total proÞts earned from the market because all 17 The relative error using Stirling's approximation is 1.7 % for n = 5, 0.8% for n = 10, and 0.4% for n = 20. 18 This limit can be veriÞed directly by using the formula
and with p i given by (8) .
consumers buy. This means that the monopoly proÞt level is attained in the market when the number of Þrms is very large even though the average transaction price is half of the monopoly price! We now look at the limit properties of the proÞt ratios. By Proposition 4, all other Þrms earn less than Firm 1, and the greatest disparity between Þrms' proÞts is between Firms 1
and n. Hence, we consider the limit:
We can evaluate this expression using Stirling's approximation to give:
Therefore, the ratio of proÞts for any pair of Þrms is no more than 1.27.
Numerical examples
In order to check equilibrium existence, we calculated the proÞt of each Þrm when it deviates from its candidate equilibrium position, to any price in We also veriÞed that any local equilibrium is also global for the other Þrms and for other values of n. 19 Note that the proÞt functions are not generally quasi-concave.
6 Further directions
Comparison to multi-outlet monopoly
One of the results of the competitive analysis is that aggregate proÞts increase with the number of goods (at least initially, although eventually they may fall, as seen in Section 5.2).
The factors at play here are price discrimination and competition. In this subsection, we hold the competitive effect Þxed by analyzing the behavior of a monopolist selling multiple goods. For concreteness, we shall refer to this as the multi-outlet monopoly in keeping with the passive search idea of a consumer who encounters opportunities randomly at different geographical points.
We therefore derive the prices chosen by a single Þrm that sells n products, given the reservation price demand system. The multi-outlet monopolist sets n prices, p 1 , ..., p n to
where we have deÞned F (p n+1 ) = 1.
We Þrst derive the formula that determines the highest price, p n . Rearranging the Þrst-order condition yields
The solution is readily compared to the competitive solution as given by (3), which differs only by the inclusion of the second term in the current incarnation. This term denotes the extra proÞt gained on the other products sold, and constitutes a positive externality that is not internalized at the competitive solution. Since this term is positive, the right-hand side of (9) is clearly higher under multi-outlet monopoly than under competition. Recalling that our assumption of (−1)-concavity of 1 − F implies that
is a decreasing function, then the solution to (9) is clearly higher than the solution to (3). The highest price therefore exceeds the price that would be set by a single product monopolist.
We now derive the relevant expression for product k and proceed by recursion. Indeed, the Þrst-order condition for product k can be written as
which is simply the extra revenue on product k plus the extra revenue on all lower-priced products. Clearly the last term on the right-hand side is positive 20 and has no counterpart in the corresponding equation for p k in the competitive solution. The Þrst two terms, the marginal revenue terms, are decreasing in p k under the assumption of (−1)-concavity of
is the same at any p k as in the competitive solution, so it remains to consider the behavior of D k . We have already shown that p n is higher under multi-outlet monopoly. This though implies that D n−1 is higher at any value of p n−1 < p n .
Hence the right-hand side of (10) is higher, and, since it is a decreasing function of p k , this implies a higher solution. But then the same argument applies to the price of product n − 2 and so on back down all the product line. This establishes that all prices are higher under multi-outlet monopoly.
It is helpful to look at the duopoly equilibrium and see how the two-outlet monopoly solution differs. First, the lower price has no effect on proÞts earned on the higher-priced product, since the latter only caters to those consumers with high reservation prices. However, the proÞt earned on the lower-priced product are increasing in the higher price since a higher price increases the number of consumers who buy the low-price good. Internalizing 20 Recall that
consumers from being shared by k lower price Þrms to being shared by k − 1 lower price Þrms.
this externality means that the monopolist will set a higher price (above p m ) on the top.
Given this higher price, it is also optimal to set a higher price on the other product, so that the two-product monopolist sets both prices higher than under duopoly competition. For example, consider a monopolist with two outlets and a uniform distribution of reservation prices. The two-outlet monopoly sets higher prices (p 1 = 3 7
and p 2 = ). Moreover, the price range is more than twice the size for the two-outlet monopoly.
A market with "shoppers"
Here we investigate how the equilibrium prices change when we introduce a fraction of consumers who always buy from the cheapest Þrm, while the market size remains Þxed at 1.
These consumers are termed "shoppers" as they correspond to individuals with zero search costs in the standard search literature (such as Rob, 1985 , or Stahl, 1996 . Alternatively, they are the "natives" that buy the bargains in the Tourists and Natives model of Salop and Stiglitz (1977) . These consumers are assumed to have the same distribution of reservation prices as the others. For them, though, the reservation price only serves to determine whether to buy or not. A shopper always buys from the cheapest Þrm (and will not buy when the cheapest price exceeds her reservation price).
Part of the interest here is to determine whether such consumers "police" the market by causing Þrms to charge lower prices. Clearly if there were only such (classical) consumers present in the market, the outcome would be the standard Bertrand equilibrium at which price equals marginal cost. The surprising result here is that introducing shoppers serves actually to increase prices. In other words, people who search out the lowest price can exert a negative externality on the others.
To see this, consider the calculus of the lowest-priced Þrm. This is the Þrm that will attract all the shoppers in the market. Recall the Þrst-order condition is D 1 +p 1 ∂D 1 /∂p 1 = 0.
Replacing some consumers with shoppers does not affect the derivative ∂D 1 /∂p 1 since the shoppers always buy from the cheapest Þrm. However, increasing the fraction of shoppers does increase D 1 because none of them buy from the other Þrms, whereas some of the population they are replacing did buy from those Þrms. Thus (holding other prices constant) the lowest price rises. However, since the other prices are independent of the lowest price, the assumption that the other prices are unchanged holds true. The result that price can increase is dependent on the pure strategy equilibrium still holding true. If there are too many shoppers, the only equilibria are in mixed strategies. 21 The uniform distribution provides an illustration. Let the fraction of shoppers be ∆, and suppose there are two Þrms. For p 1 < p 2 , the demand facing the second Þrm is
, which is half of the non-shoppers whose reservation prices exceed p 2 .
As expected, the candidate equilibrium higher price is 1 /2 (the monopoly price). The demand facing the lower price Þrm is
This yields a candidate equilibrium lower price of b p 1 = (3 + ∆) /6, which increases with ∆ as claimed. We now check that this is an equilibrium by Þnding ∆ small enough that Firm 2 does not wish to deviate to just undercutting the lower price (clearly this is the only deviation to check). Deviating yields a proÞt b
] which is to be compared to the status quo proÞt of (1 − ∆) /4. Substituting, deviation is unproÞtable as long as (3 + ∆) (5 − ∆) (1 + ∆) < 32 (1 − ∆), meaning that equilibrium exists as long as the fraction of shoppers, ∆, is below its critical value of around 34.5 %. 21 Results for that region indicate that increasing the number of shoppers beyond the initial threshold does serve to decrease average prices and hence to improve economic efficiency. Varian (1980 Varian ( , 1981 claimed that in his model of sales, it is possible that increasing the number of uninformed consumers will decrease the price paid by the informed. However, Morgan and Sefton (2001) have shown that this result is not possible in Varian's model. We have shown that such an effect can arise here. 22 
Concluding remarks
In this paper we have presented a model of price dispersion from consumer search based in Stigler's tradition. It is an approach that is complementary to the existing models of consumer search, which can only generate dispersion either as a mixed strategy outcome or from production cost differences. The key ingredients of our approach are passive consumer search and that consumers use a simple reservation price rule in making purchases.
Our approach generates asymmetric price equilibria in pure strategies. Whilst it is straightforward to generate asymmetric price equilibria in standard Bertrand oligopoly models when Þrms differ according to exogenous differences in costs or qualities, the result here holds for ex-ante symmetric Þrms in a simple price game. 23 There has been considerable interest in the literature in generating equilibrium price dispersion with homogenous products -this has been one of the major objectives of equilibrium models with consumer search (see for example . Price dispersion has also been generated in the literature through variations of Varian's (1980) model of sales and the consumer search models that follow a similar vein (e.g. Rob, 1985) . However, such dispersion arises as the re- 22 Increasing the fraction of non-shoppers has the same effect on prices as decreasing the fraction of shoppers in our model. for some stimulating empirical evidence in this regard).
To understand the alternative viewpoint proposed in this paper, let us return momentarily to the simple version of the Diamond paradox, where all consumers have positive search costs past the Þrst search. No consumer with a valuation below the monopoly price will ever incur the search cost to Þnd a second price, and will therefore never buy. Suppose instead that consumers might in the future get the opportunity of buying the good without active search. 24 This means that a Þrm with a price other than the monopoly one might expect sales, and thus it may be worthwhile for a Þrm to choose a lower price. Arguably, the markets for many goods do not follow the "active search" model of constant cost per search, developed so far in the literature. In practice, consumers frequently encounter purchase opportunities for goods that they are not actively searching for. Active search may be more apt to describe markets for big-ticket consumer durables, like cars and refrigerators, but it seems a poor description of buyer behavior for more casually sought goods like a hat, a disposable camera, or a print.
For many goods, search is quite passive. A consumer may see something in a shop window while on a shopping trip for another item, or while on vacation, etc. In that sense, consumers do not leave markets, and each individual remains a latent buyer at any time so Þrms may be able to pick up demand from them with low prices. This means that Þrms have an incentive not to bunch at the monopoly price because a Þrm setting a lower price will pick up more consumers (contrast the "active search" framework) and so price dispersion can be sustained as a pure strategy equilibrium, as has been shown in this paper.
We Þnish with a comment on the distribution of reservation prices. We have assumed that this distribution has no mass points. In practice, this is unlikely to be the case if individuals use rough rules of thumb that round off to the nearest dollar (say). Indeed, if the reservation price rule for a mass of consumers is of the form "buy if less than $10" then we would expect prices of $ 9.99 if there are several Þrms. Indeed, we would expect several Þrms to set the same price if there are enough of them. Thus the general version of the model with mass points and round number reservation prices can be expected to generate both clumping of
Þrms on certain prices and the phenomenon of "nines" in pricing (see also Basu, 1997 , for an alternative treatment of this problem that relies on the costs for consumers to mentally process digits in prices). 
